Quoting Swiss Sunday paper Sonntagszeitung, Reuters reports that Swiss bank Credit Suisse has begun closing down offshore accounts of U.S. citizens who haven’t declared their funds to the U.S. authorities.

While still a one-on-one measure at the moment, it is excepted to initiate a general move out of the U.S. offshore banking in its entirety.

Read the full Reuters story here:

Credit Suisse starts shutting U.S. offshore accounts: report

The online SonntagsZeitung article (in German) can currently (no permalink referenced) be found here:

CS wird es in den USA zu heiss

Filed under: Banking Secrets> Investing Offshore by editor Date 12 April, 2009
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BBC reports that the UK government hasn’t given up on pushing for secret inquests:

Ministers are reintroducing measures to hold some inquests in secret on national security grounds.

The new bill covering coroners, murder laws, witness protection and sentencing comes months after the secret inquest plans were dropped in Parliament.

[…]

Under the proposals, the press and public would be banned from inquests where the government can successfully argue that some of the circumstances of the death must be kept secret on national security grounds.

Last year,  the proposal was met with stiff opposition with many people arguing that this was the death blow to the independent coroner system, a mainstay of legal transparency and a safeguard against governmental hush-ups.

Expectably, this move was originally tied to “anti terrorism” legislation - an all too common tactics these days whenever administrations are keen to subvert and effectively nix civil rights. This has been happening all across the Western world and we cannot reasonably expect it to end any time soon. If nothing else, Big Brother has always been infamous on the score of voraciousness…

Filed under: The Global Context by admin Date 14 January, 2009
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The government of Vanuatu have recently suspended indefinitely all car, yacht and plane registrations for non-residents. As an alternative, the Cook Islands are now offering a similar program.

Cook Islands Vehicle Registration is possible for most types of passenger vehicles, including small trucks and motorcycles. Requirements are very simple. The entire procedure may be carried out over the internet, with the plates being delivered to you by DHL courier.

Vehicles may be registered under your personal name, or under the name of an offshore company created specially for the purpose (ask us for a quote). In the latter case, you will receive a document notarized in the Cook Islands, stating that you are allowed to drive the car anywhere in the world. It will appear that you are an employee of the Cook Islands Corporation, driving the company car.

Global Nomads have found a special ‘extra private’ solution where an existing nominee company can handle your registration. This saves you the hassle and expense of forming your own Cook Islands company, if you don’t wish to handle the offshore car registration in your own name. If you are an existing owner of our report Offshore Options for Tax-Free Car Registration please contact our editorial team for updated info.

Filed under: Cars + Driving Licenses by editor Date 11 October, 2008
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In a recent interview with the UK’s Daily Telegraph, Dr Joel Brenner, the US National Counterintelligence Executive, warned that hundreds of chip and pin machines in stores and supermarkets across Europe have been tampered with to allow details of shoppers’ credit card accounts to be relayed to overseas fraudsters.

Criminal gangs have allegedly doctored chip and PIN machines either during manufacturing in China or shortly after leaving the production line, in order to collect shopper credit card account details then transmit it overseas. The devices were then expertly resealed and exported to Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium.

The counterintelligence chief is quoted as saying: “Previously only a nation state’s intelligence service would have been capable of pulling off this type of operation. It’s scary.”

Hundreds of devices have been copying credit and debit card details over the past nine months and sending the data by way of mobile phone networks to hackers in Lahore, Pakistan, The Telegraph report alleges. MasterCard first uncovered the plot at the start of the year after detecting suspicious charges to British and other European accounts.

The scam is believed to have resulted in the loss of tens of millions of pounds by criminals creating cloned cards, making phone or internet transactions, or withdrawing cash from the account. Thieves typically wait at least two months before using the stolen data in order to make it harder for investigators to determine what happened, says the report.

According to one commentator on the site, who apparently worked for the government of a certain OECD nation, security services had also discovered that Chinese made mobile phones could be switched on remotely and used as eavesdropping devices in meetings etc.  “To hear that EFTPOS equipment is also hacked surprises me not one iota,” he writes.

Filed under: Banking Secrets by editor Date 11 October, 2008
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Here’s proof positive that Google’s new Chrome browser calls home extensively, making it an undeniable piece of spyware - and possibly another PR disaster in the making for the crowd at the ‘Plex. On the upside, Chrome offers some viable options of turning the tables against them for more efficient organic SEO as well.

Read more… 

Filed under: Privacy Tools by editor Date 5 September, 2008
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By

Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

A lot has been written about last month’s conflict between Russia and Georgia, and the continuing tensions in the region. Certainly, there were many important lessons to be gleaned from the conflict relating to the Russian military, Russian foreign policy and the broader geopolitical balance of power.

One facet of the Russian operations in Georgia that has been somewhat overlooked is the intelligence aspect. Clearly, the speed with which the Russian military responded to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia indicates that they were not caught off guard. They knew in advance what the Georgians were planning and had time to prepare their troops for a quick response to the Georgian offensive.

It is important to remember that the Russian operation in Georgia did not happen in a vacuum or without warning. It was a foreseeable outcome of the resurgence of Russian power that began in 1999 when Vladimir Putin came to power, and an outward demonstration of Russia’s increasing assertiveness. One important element of Russia’s ascendancy under Putin has been a resurgence of the Russian intelligence agencies. The excellent intelligence Russia had regarding Georgian intentions in South Ossetia is proof that the Russian intelligence agencies are indeed back in force. But Putin’s rise to power clearly demonstrates that while these intelligence elements may have been weakened, they were never totally gone.

As pressure continues to build between Russia and the West — and as we perhaps slip closer to a second Cold War — it is worth remembering that an actual armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact never took place despite military tension and some warfare between proxies. Rather, the Cold War was fought largely with intelligence services. Certainly, the Cold War led to the birth and rapid growth of huge intelligence agencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. These intelligence agencies will also play a significant role in the current strain between Russia and the West.

The world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this age of globalization, e-commerce and outsourcing, there are many more Western companies with interests in Russia than during the Cold War. This means that an escalation of Cold War-type intelligence activity will have profound effects on multinational corporations.

Historical Context

The time period following the fall of the Soviet Union was catastrophic for Russia — workers went unpaid, social services collapsed and poverty was epidemic. The oligarchs seemingly stole everything that was not nailed down and organized crime groups became extremely powerful. Public corruption, which had been endemic (though somewhat predictable) in the old Soviet system, worsened dramatically. Many Russians were ashamed of what their country had become; others feared it would implode entirely.

Into this chaos came Vladimir Putin, a former Soviet intelligence officer who ascended in Russian politics due in part to his significant connections. But Putin’s rise was also largely aided by his firm handling of the second Chechen war in 1999 and the fact that he offered the Russian people hope that their national greatness could somehow be restored. While Putin left the Russian presidency in May 2008 and is now the prime minister again (as he was in the final months of the Yeltsin presidency), he continues to be immensely powerful and extremely popular. Most Russians believe Putin saved Russia from sure destruction.

A major part of Putin’s strategy to regain control over the government, economy, oligarchs and organized crime groups was his program to reorganize and strengthen the Russian intelligence agencies, which had been severely atrophied since the fall of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, politicians such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin saw a powerful intelligence agency as a potential threat — with good reason. Because of this threat, laws were enacted to fracture and weaken the once-powerful agency. In 1991, the KGB was dismantled after a failed coup against Gorbachev in which some KGB units participated and tanks rolled onto Red Square.

Following additional failed coup attempts, the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the KGB’s immediate successor, was split into several smaller agencies in 1995 under the perception that it remained too powerful. By creating competition among the smaller intelligence services, higher-ups hoped that additional coup attempts could be avoided. Following this shattering of the FSK, the counterintelligence core of the former KGB and FSK became known as the Federal Security Bureau (FSB). The foreign intelligence portion of the FSK became the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

When Putin came into power, he instituted an ambitious plan to reconstitute the FSB. He has steadily worked to reconsolidate most of the splinter intelligence agencies back under the FSB, correcting much of the inefficiency that existed among the separate agencies and making the new combined agency stronger and more integrated. Moreover, since 1999, Putin has ensured that the FSB receive large funding increases to train, recruit and modernize after years of disregard. Currently, the SVR remains separate from the FSB, but other crucial components such as the Federal Border Service and Federal Guard Service have been reintegrated, as has the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency.

Additionally, Putin has tapped many former KGB and current FSB members to fill positions within Russian big business, the Duma and other political posts. Putin’s initial reasoning was that those within the intelligence community thought of Russia the same way he did — as a great state domestically and internationally. Putin also knew that those within the intelligence community would not flinch at his sometimes brutal means of consolidating Russia politically, economically, socially and in other ways. It could be reasonably argued that Russia has become an “intelligence state” under Putin.

Since assuming power, Putin has also worked to strengthen the Russian military and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. The GRU was undoubtedly very involved in the operation in Georgia, as was the SVR. There are some who suggest that Russian agents of influence may have played a part in convincing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to attack South Ossetia and spring a trap the Russians had set.

Implications for Business

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, foreign corporations have been very busy in Russia as they scramble for market share, attempt to profit from Russia’s massive natural resources and seek to meet growing demand for consumer products. For these companies, growing Russian nationalism and tension with the West increases both the chance of regulatory and legal hassles and the possibility that Russian intelligence activity might be directed their way. In other words, as tensions rise, so could the risk for Western corporations.

Not all these problems are new. As a young KGB officer, Putin earned his living by stealing technology from the West. And he has since encouraged Russian intelligence agencies to expand their collection programs with the awareness that such information can assist the Russian economy and specifically the revival of the defense sector. While the Russians have an advanced weapons research and development infrastructure, they are very pragmatic. They do not see the need to spend the money to develop a technology from scratch when they can steal or buy it for a fraction of the cost and effort. This pragmatism was clearly demonstrated in their early nuclear weapons program.

Just as Russia’s reinvigorated intelligence collection efforts were gaining steam, the United States was hit by the 9/11 attacks. As a result, domestic intelligence agencies in the United States and many other Western nations focused on the counterterrorism mission and diverted counterintelligence resources to help in that fight. It would take several years for the domestic counterintelligence efforts to get back to their pre-9/11 levels, and like the Chinese, the Russian intelligence services took broad advantage of that window of opportunity to recruit sources and obtain critical information from foreign companies. Additionally, the Russians have gone to great lengths to steal intellectual property from foreign firms operating inside Russia, either by infiltrating their companies with agents or by recruiting employees.

The Russians are not only drawn to companies that produce sophisticated military equipment. Like the Chinese and others, they are interested in collecting information on emerging technology that is not yet classified but has potential military application. These sectors include materials research, nanotechnology, advanced electronics and information technology. Ultimately, however, they will not turn their backs on the opportunity to obtain sophisticated current weapons system data.

Russian collection and recruitment efforts will also not be confined to Russia or the United States. The Russians can gain as much information by recruiting an American businessman in Tokyo, Vienna or Mexico City as they can from one they recruit in New York or Seattle, if they choose their target wisely. The Soviets and Russians have long enjoyed operating out of third countries. During the Cold War, their primary platform for collecting intelligence against the United States was Mexico City, and their preferred platform to collect against European targets was Vienna.

Former KGB officers are also heavily involved in trafficking Russian and Eastern European women for prostitution in Tokyo, Dubai and Miami. These former KGB officers could easily utilize their positions of access to identify potential recruits for friends at their old agency, perhaps for a profit — consider how many former intelligence officers now are working as contractors for U.S. intelligence. The FSB/SVR might not be the KGB in name, but they clearly are the KGB in spirit and will not hesitate to use sexual or other blackmail if that is more effective than money, ideology or ego as a recruiting hook.

For Western companies operating inside Russia, an increase in tensions will, in all likelihood, mean an increased scrutiny of the companies’ activities as well as an increased focus on their expatriate employees in an effort to recruit sources and to locate Western intelligence officers. Like it or not, all intelligence agencies use nonofficial cover to get their officers into hostile countries — and corporate cover is widely used. Indeed, the Russians have long claimed that the United States and other countries have been using businesses and nongovernmental organizations to provide cover to intelligence officers seeking to undermine Russian influence in the former Soviet Union and to operate inside Russia itself.

Nonofficial cover officers (referred to as NOCs in intelligence parlance) are intelligence officers without visible links to their government and therefore not protected by diplomatic immunity. For this reason, NOC operations are somewhat riskier. Harder to identify as intelligence officers, NOCs are frequently assigned to sensitive tasks — those that a host country counterintelligence service would dearly love to learn about.

Keeping this in mind, Russian counterintelligence services will be carefully looking over the business visa applications of Western companies. Surveillance activities on expatriate employees will also likely increase as the Russians work to identify any potential undercover intelligence officers. They will also seek to recruit expatriate and local employees who can act as spotters to identify any potential intelligence officers.

This surveillance of Western businesses may apply to both corporate offices and employees’ residences. Businessmen may be physically surveilled and their residences subjected to technical surveillance and mail/garbage covers. Domestic workers may also be recruited in an effort to collect information on their employers. Known or suspected NOCs will be carefully watched and will likely even be overtly harassed.

So far, we have not heard of the Russians directing this type of aggressive surveillance activity against U.S. companies, or of U.S. companies having problems obtaining visas for their employees. But as the tensions increase between Russia and the United States, and as intelligence operations become increasingly hostile, it is only a matter of time before they do.

Copyright 2008 by Stratfor.

Filed under: Finance+Economy by editor Date 3 September, 2008
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By

George Friedman

The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:

The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.

The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.

The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.

In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.

The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):

First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.

Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.

Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.

Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.

Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.

Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”

The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.

The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”

Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.

These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.

This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.

The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.

The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.

But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.

More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.

In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia
could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.

At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.

The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them.

Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.

This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.

The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.

The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.

There are four broad U.S. options:

Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want –or honor — such a deal.

Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.

Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.

Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.

We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.

If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.

We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.

Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.

We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.

Copyright 2008 by Stratfor.

Filed under: The Global Context by editor Date 3 September, 2008
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Fancy a holiday in Dubai? It could be an easy way to obtain a legally valid second drivers liencse (driving licence)

This is a new policy introduced following a recent change in the law which requires tourists wishing to rent a car to have either a valid International Driving Permit, or a local Duba licence.

Tourists who do not already have an international driving permit, can apply for a temporary UAE driving licence at RTA branches located either at the City Centre in Deira or the Union Co-operative in Al Tawar, instead of going to the RTA head office in Rashidiya. Both branches are open from 9am to 9pm, Sunday to Thursday.

When applying, tourists must present their passports, eye test results, driving licences of the countries of their origin, and Dh110 as application fee. A temporary UAE driving licence is issued the same day.

There is one catch: this licence can be issued only to the nationals of European countries, the US, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, South Korea and Japan.

Filed under: Cars + Driving Licenses by editor Date 29 July, 2008
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A consignment of 3,000 “useless” blank biometric passports has been stolen on its way to British embassies throughout the world. Or at least, the Identity & Passport Service says they’re useless. A recent article in The Register shows why nothing could be further from the truth.

The passports were stolen from a courier vehicle in Manchester, UK while the driver stopped to buy a newspaper.

The article explains how even though the passports have high-tech chips installed, they can easily be used for a variety of fraudulent applications from opening bank accounts to getting jobs, as well as for travel in countries that do not yet have chip readers at border control points.

The final paragraph makes a chilling point:

… it’s still early in the relationship between forgers and biometric passports. One could perhaps envisage a future where businesses that regularly had to check passports (say, tourist hotels) could be ‘farmed’ by forgers for passport data, producing data banks of passports that hadn’t been stolen, but that could be cloned on demand - just pick somebody the right age and appearance. Put that together with a stock of blank biometric passports and you’ve got a nice little business there.

Your Global Nomads editors highly recommend this article!

Filed under: Nomads' Grapevine by editor Date 29 July, 2008
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As readers of our Caribbean Offshore Contacts Report are aware, there are only two countries in the world offering so-called Economic Citizenship programs - that is, the chance to buy a legal second citizenship and passport within a matter of weeks.

Those two countries are The Commonwealth of Dominica (an English-speaking Caribbean nation, not to be confused with the Dominican Republic) and the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis. The difference between the two citizenship programs is that in the past Dominica required a “non-refundable investment” paid direct to the government, whereas St Kitts required the purchase of real estate, worth at least $350,000, in specific designated projects.

Many people were put off the St Kitts program due to the real estate investment. Whilst it could be a good deal long term, and there was some chance of seeing your money back again one day, coming up with $400,000 for the privilege of owning real estate on a hurricane-prone island can be a hassle, especially if you never plan to live there. For a lot of people, it was easier just to pay and get the second passport.

So, quite recently, the authorities in St Kitts came up with an alternative. Although the real estate investment option is still valid, instead of buying real estate, you can now choose to make a one time donation to the Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation. This requires substantially less up-front capital, as the contribution required is $200,000.

The Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation (SIDF) was established for the purpose of supporting the former sugar workers, conducting research into the development of industries to replace the sugar industry, funding the development of these alternative industries and providing further support to secure the sustainability of such industries.

A little history: the Citizenship Program was established in 1984, which makes this the longest established citizenship-by-investment program. Regulations regarding citizenship-by-investment are contained in Part II, Section 3 (5) of the Citizenship Act, 1984. The actual government policies with regard to the Citizenship-by-Investment program (such as investment requirements etc.) are set by Government through Cabinet Decision.

The principal advantages promoted by the St Kitts government are:

• Citizenship is valid for life, for the applicant and all eligible family members.
• Dual Citizenship is permitted, without the requirement to notify the applicants home country, and without any need for the applicant to reside in St Kitts and Nevis.
• Passports can be issued to the applicant an all eligible family members, and may be easily renewed via a worldwide network of consulates.
• St Kitts citizens enjoy a wide range of visa-free travel:- Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and most British commonwealth countries. When a visa is required, they are also relatively easy to obtain.
• New citizens qualify for full residency status including the right to work in St. Kitts and Nevis
• Perhaps best of all: Tax Free Status on foreign income, capital gains, gift, wealth and inheritance tax

To qualify for Citizenship-by-Investment via the Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation, there are four different categories:

• Single applicant: US$ 200,000 contribution required
• Applicant with up to three dependants (i.e. one spouse and two children below the age of 18): US$ 250,000 contribution required
• Applicant with up to five dependants (i.e. one spouse and four children): US$ 300,000 contribution required
• Applicant with six and more dependants: US$ 400,000 contribution required.

In each of these categories, the total amount includes all government and due diligence fees. The documentation required for an application is strict but reasonable, and the application procedure is well organized.

If you would like further information, read the Global Nomads Caribbean Offshore Contacts Report “Offshore and Sunny” for recommended citizenship consultants and other Caribbean contacts.

Filed under: Nomads' Grapevine> Privacy Tools by editor Date 26 July, 2008
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